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Over fifteen years since the publication of the Responsibility to Protect report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), it would be 
fair to say that the doctrine of the responsibility to protect (RtoP) has saturated the 
discourse of international policy in terms of responding to humanitarian crises and 
atrocities. The tenets of RtoP have become embedded in numerous speeches and 
reports of United Nations (UN) Secretaries-General and their special advisers, in 
resolutions of the UN Security Council, in General Assembly debates and – not least – 
in countless academic seminars, policy papers, workshops, briefs, edited collections, 
journal articles and handbooks. The tenets of RtoP are widely seen as having 
informed the international military responses to conflict and atrocities in Côte d’Ivoire 
and Libya in 2011.1 Yet despite the insistent language of responsibility in the doctrine, 
many could name on-going conflicts and crises that have seen mass atrocities 
resulting from state neglect, predation or oppression and yet have seen no meaningful 
international response. The Syrian civil war would likely top the list, but conflicts in 
Burundi, Yemen, South Sudan and the Central African Republic would be no less 
plausible candidates in this grim repertoire.  
 
How can it be that RtoP has become at once normalised, and yet applied so unevenly? 
How can it be that ‘preventive military intervention’ has become more acceptable, and 
yet non-intervention remains the rule in practice?2 In this paper I argue that we can 
better understand these paradoxes and contradictions if we re-conceptualise RtoP as 
an attempt to ‘norm the exception’ – that is, as an attempt to reorganise international 
order by pre-emptively incorporating political responses to humanitarian emergencies. 
It is nothing new to consider RtoP as a question of exceptionalism, as the doctrine is 
explicitly formulated around questions of crisis that may require overriding the 
sovereignty of states.3 This paper takes a second step however – to consider how 
‘claims of exceptionality’ function politically.4 In other words, how do such claims 
‘structure stakes and positions in international struggles for legitimacy and 
authority?’5 Using lenses crafted from international political theory, I make a first cut 
at applying this approach in this paper.  
                                                 
1 Alex Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The new politics of protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the 
responsibility to protect’, International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011): 825-50 
2 On ‘preventive military intervention’ under RtoP, see Roland Paris, ‘The “Responsibility to Protect” 
and the Structural Problems of Humanitarian Intervention’, International Peacekeeping 21, no. 5 
(2014): 569-603 
3 These are taken to be the three components parts of the RtoP: the responsibility to prevent, the 
responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. Cf. International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty, The RtoP: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001). Henceforward the ‘ICISS 
report’ 
4 Jef Huysmans, ‘International Politics of Insecurity: Normativity, Inwardness and the Exception’, 
Security Dialogue 30, no.1 (2006): p.12. Henceforward Huysmans, IPI. 
5 Ibid. 





This is not to say that humanitarian emergencies are merely phoney episodes 
‘constructed’ by self-serving media and aid agencies, and exaggerated in the struggle 
to maintain their institutional prominence. Nor am I seeking merely to draw attention 
to instances of humanitarian hypocrisy and selectivity (important as these are). Rather, 
I want to show that different types of exceptionalist practice will have different 
implications for international order. I suggest that studying RtoP in this way firstly, 
helps us understand how RtoP has displaced humanitarian intervention.6 Second, this 
approach opens up a new critical vantage point on the doctrine, which goes beyond 
the issue of the imperialist appropriation of humanitarianism, and even beyond 
questions of intervention between states. Instead, using the international political 
theory of exceptionalism we can see how the idea of state power itself is being 
transformed through RtoP, with the protective functions of the state displacing its 




Exceptionalism has become a familiar theme in discussions of how civil liberties are 
undermined by the waging of the war on terror.7  Studying exceptionalism in the 
context of the international sphere is perhaps a less familiar exercise, therefore 
requiring some justification and markers as to how such an analysis may differ from 
studying emergency politics in a domestic setting. This is the first part of the 
discussion below. After having reviewed the current status of RtoP thought and 
practice, we can now turn to look at the links between RtoP and exceptionalism. 
Before we can do this, to understand how RtoP has institutionalised exceptionalism in 
international politics requires us to understand how RtoP emerged out of humanitarian 
intervention.  
 
I show how the RtoP was justified as a legitimate shift from the era of humanitarian 
intervention through claims for exceptionalism. I show that the specific type of 
exceptionalism that advanced in RtoP doctrine is a decisionistic and existential 
concept of exceptionalist politics. Drawing on the work of Jef Huysmans, Ian 
Zuckerman and Jean Cohen, I draw out the political implications of the specific type 
of exceptionalism and the conceptions of political identity and practice that it 
embodies. I go on to argue that the new exceptionalist understanding of atrocity 
prevention embodied in RtoP reflects the surrender of a classical liberal telos, oriented 
towards the ultimate elimination of irrationality and violence. In its place, we have a 
presentist, pessimistic vision that effectively normalises recurrent extreme violence 
through the very effort to contain it. I then move to consider how the responsibilities 
proscribed for states in RtoP doctrine reflects a new vision of state power where 
legitimacy is measured by effectiveness in the provision of security from extreme 
violence, and I consider how this erodes the foundations of representative government 
and popular sovereignty.   
 
                                                 
6 Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a 
Unipolar Era’, Security Dialogue 35, no.2 (2004), p.135 
7 E.g., Ian Zuckerman, ‘One Law for War and Peace? Judicial Review and Emergency Powers between 
the Norm and Exception’, Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 
13, no. 4 (2006): 522-545; Jef Huysmans, ‘Minding Exceptions: The Politics of Insecurity and Liberal 
Democracy’, Contemporary Political Theory 3, no. 3 (2004): 321-341. 




The Study of Exceptionalism in International Politics 
 
The politics of exceptionalism is most closely studied in relation to domestic settings. 
When an event breaches what is taken to be the routine functioning of social and 
political order in an extraordinary fashion, an exception is generated: ‘a suspension, 
break, or transformation of all or part of the fundamental formal or informal laws 
governing a political order.’ 8  The idea of exceptionalism thus presupposes a 
nominally rational, secure and institutionalised political order. But it is precisely the 
absence of such an order that is traditionally believed to be the defining characteristic 
of the international system. The system of states is classically held to be a political 
system characterised by the persistence rather than dearth of overwhelming threats, as 
famously evoked by Martin Wight: ‘International politics is the realm of recurrence 
and repetition; it is the field in which political action is most regularly necessitous.’9  
 
How then should the study of exceptionalism in the international realm be justified 
and conducted? Refusing to accept Wight’s eschatological views of international 
order need not make us naïvely idealistic about the status or validity of international 
norms. 10  We can treat exceptionalism in international politics either as ‘a single 
constitutive given’ of the international system,11 or as ‘a political problem that invites 
multiple responses’.12  I will follow the latter course in this paper. As Huysmans 
reminds us, such questions can be seen as questions of politics in general: ‘The fact 
that one can transpose legal theories focusing on the state and domestic politics to 
international relations is not surprising given that theories of the state are also theories 
of the political more generally.’13  
 
As it is nothing new to assert that a normative and legal infrastructure (however 
rudimentary) exists in the anarchic political system of the international realm, it is 
does beg the question of why studies of exceptionalism as a political practice in 
international affairs have hitherto been so rare.14 Perhaps such questions can only 
arise in periods such as ours, when international law has been endowed with an 
elevated status15 and the world’s various legal systems have undergone a period of 
homogenisation.16 Satisfactorily answering this question is beyond the scope of this 
paper. In any case, studying RtoP as a type of political exceptionalism is consistent 
                                                 
8 Zuckerman, ‘One Law for War and Peace?’, p.523 
9 Martin Wight, ‘Why is There No International Theory?’ in James Der Derian, ed., International 
Theory: Critical Investigations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p.25; see further Huysmans, IPI, p.14.  
10 On Wight’s eschatological approach to international politics, see Ian Hall, The International Thought 
of Martin Wight (New York Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006). 
11 See further Jef Huysmans, ‘International Politics of Exception: Competing Visions of International 
Political Order Between Law and Politics’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 31, no. 2 (2006): 153-
154. Henceforward ‘Huysmans IPE.’ 
12 Huysmans, IPE, p.140.  
13 Ibid. 
14 The idea that the rudiments of society and norms are possible in the states system despite the absence 
of security is of course the basis of whole traditions of theorising about international relations, notably 
the English School. Cf. Hedley Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations’, in James Der 
Derian, ed., op. cit., pp. 75-93.  
15  Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters: International Relations as a New Natural Law’, 
European Journal of International Relations 15, no.3 (2009): p.415 
16 For a political and legal survey of these developments, see Jean L. Cohen ‘Whose Sovereignty? 
Empire versus International Law’, Ethics and International Affairs 18, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05):  pp.5-
11. 




with the way in which supporters, theorists and advocates of the doctrine approach the 
issue. Studies of humanitarian intervention (the precursor to the RtoP) have been 
dominated by the English School of IR theory, which is founded on a belief in the 
validity and desirability of an international rule of law and normative order (a view 
which admits of the possibility of derogation from that order – an exception – and the 
possibility of evolution in international norms.17) Indeed, it was the English School 
theorist of humanitarian intervention Nicholas J. Wheeler who borrowed and adapted 
the Churchillian language of exceptionalism in war when he spoke of a ‘supreme 
humanitarian emergency’.18 So, what is the current state of RtoP, and what is the 
place of exceptionalism within it? 
 
The Current State of RtoP: Theory and Practice  
 
2015 was the tenth anniversary of the inclusion of RtoP principles in the Outcome 
Document of the 2005 World Summit. In its most basic form, ‘the endorsement of 
[RtoP] by the General Assembly and Security council [in 2005] demonstrates a broad 
consensus that international society should be engaged in protecting populations from 
grave harm.’ 19  The Outcome Document articulated the role of the international 
community in this regard in terms of protecting ‘populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.’20 These were the four mass 
atrocity crimes. There is little doubt that RtoP has diffused through international 
politics more rapidly than the tenets of humanitarian intervention ever did. This is 
evident if we compare the legitimacy accorded to RtoP military action compared to 
humanitarian intervention. In 1999, the humanitarian intervention by NATO in 
Kosovo had to be conducted without UN authorisation due to Chinese and Russian 
suspicions, and the veto powers these countries wield on the UN Security Council. In 
2011 by contrast, NATO’s Libya campaign was justified by reference to civilian 
protection, and yet NATO secured tacit Sino-Russian support on the Council - tacit in 
as much as neither country vetoed UN backing for the military campaign. 
  
The legitimacy of RtoP intervention is bundled together with a wider process of 
normative change and institutional adaptation. Since its publication in 2001, the basic 
ideas outlined in the ICISS report have been reiterated in subsequent flagship UN 
reports, such as the High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change as 
well as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report In Larger Freedom.21 The 
African Union has formally endorsed RtoP as a concept in the ‘Ezulwini 
Consensus’. 22  Bernard Kouchner, foreign minister of France, called for military 
intervention in Burma to force humanitarian aid into the country in 2008 following 
                                                 
17 Cf. n. 17 above. See also Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International 
Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
21, no. 3 (1992): 463-487 
18 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society ((Oxford 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.34.  
19 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The RtoP and the problem of military intervention’, International Affairs 84, no. 4 
(2008): 630 
20 2005 World Summit, 2005 World Summit Outcome 14-16 September 2005, UN Doc A/60/L.1 20 
September 2005, §139 
21  For a discussion of the subsequent uptake of the doctrine, see Bellamy, ‘Problem of Military 
Intervention’, passim 
22 African Union, ‘The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: “The 
Ezulwini Consensus”’, Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) 6-7 March 2005. 




Cyclone Nargis and for intervention in Guinea during civil unrest following a coup in 
that country in 2009.23  ICISS commissioner Ramesh Thakur criticised Kouchner for 
demanding intervention in Burma, contrasting that case with others where he argued 
RtoP involvement could be contemplated: Kenya, Nepal, North Korea, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, and Zimbabwe.24 RtoP was even explicitly included in US president Barack 
Obama’s National Security Strategy, issued in 2010.25   
 
The doctrine has also been assimilated into UN theory and practice in a way that 
humanitarian intervention never was, despite extensive Western influence over the 
UN during the tenure of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 26  Successive UN 
Secretaries-General have established two new senior positions to forward RtoP: the 
UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and Special Adviser to the 
Secretary-General on RtoP. Although the scope of the doctrine is ‘narrow’ in so far as 
it is limited to ‘the four crimes and violations agreed … in 2005’ (namely, genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing) its implementation will be 
‘broad’, according to Secretary-General Ban27 , encompassing a full range of UN 
atrocity prevention activities. The idea of the RtoP has thus come a long way in its 
ascent to the pinnacle of global summitry: it began as part of a debate about how to 
manage conflict and cope with flows of internally displaced peoples in remote post-
Cold War conflicts.28  
 
As the doctrine has evolved over the last ten years, it is possible to identify three 
broad schools of thought on RtoP. We can label these in descending order of size and 
influence as RtoP boosters, RtoP sceptics and RtoP criticism, with each school 
overlapping with and shading into the next along a spectrum.29 For reasons of space, 
here I will only primarily focus on the ‘boosters’.30 What was striking was that even 
among proponents of RtoP the typical pattern of anniversary commentary was fairly 
                                                 
23 See, respectively, J. Marcus, ‘World Wrestles with Burma Aid Issue’ [online]. BBC News. Available 
from HTTP: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7392662.stm [Accessed 10 November 2009]; A. Katz, 
‘France’s Kouchner Urges International Intervention in Guinea’ [online]. 2009, Bloomberg. Available 
from HTTP:www.bloomsberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=aYe7A8BD.Yvc [Accessed 10 
November 2009]. 
24 Ramesh Thakur, R., Crisis and Response, 2008. International Coalition for the RtoP. Available from: 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/128-the-crisis-in-burma/1696-ramesh-thakur-
crisis-and-response [Accessed 10 November 2009]. 
25 See further US National Security Strategy: May 2010, Friday, May 28th, 2010, Government of the 
United States of America, The White House. Available online: 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/2785-
white-house-releases-may-2010-national-security-strategy-with-reference-to-rtop (accessed 8 April 
2016)  
26 Perry Anderson, ‘Made in U.S.A.’ The Nation 15 March 2007. Anderson stresses in particular the 
role of Annan’s Western advisors, including ‘theorists of humanitarian intervention from Harvard and 
Princeton like John Ruggie and Michael Doyle’. 
27 UN, ‘Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies “RtoP” at Berlin Event on “Responsible Sovereignty: 
International Cooperation for a Changed World’ 15 July 2008. Online.  Available at 
HTTP:www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11701.doc.htm. Accessed 10 March 2010. 
28 For the origins of the doctrine, see chapter one in Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect and Carsten 
Stahn ‘Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm’, The American Journal of 
International Law 101, no. 1 (Jan 2007): 99-120   
29 These labels are inspired by (and adapted) from Adrian Gallagher and J.G. Ralph, ‘The RtoP at Ten’ 
Global RtoP 7, nos. 3-4 (2015): 239-53. 
30 This decision is further warranted by the fact that RtoP boosters remain the most significant voice in 
the debate, and in any case this paper is seeking to develop new critique of RtoP doctrine. 




restrained and modest in its retrospective evaluation of the doctrine’s progress, noting 
on the one hand the institutionalisation of the doctrine in policy and discussion. On 
the other hand, these same evaluations note the failure to actually implement the 
doctrine with regards to preventing atrocities with military action (Burundi, South 
Sudan, etc.).31 Thus much of this commentary is broadly whiggish in tone, observing 
a significant array of problems while remaining modestly optimistic and confident 
about the prospects of future progress. 
 
Assessing the significance of the gap between expectations and implementation is the 
prime area of disagreement between RtoP boosters and RtoP sceptics – that is, 
between those who deem the gap essentially bridgeable and those who deem it 
unbridgeable. It would be too crude to designate this gap as a gap between rhetoric 
and reality, not only because military intervention in Libya is widely accepted as an 
RtoP operation, but also because the absorption of the doctrine into policy has gone 
beyond the level of talk, motivating significant institutional reorganisation. However, 
with the focus on the gap in implementation, what is commonly left out of these 
analyses is how far norms associated with state sovereignty have been transformed as 
a result of this process.  
 
In his evaluation of the RtoP anniversary, former UN special adviser on the 
prevention of genocide Edward Luck said he was struck by the fact that claims of 
rights to non-interference and territorial integrity did not constitute the main obstacles 
to RtoP promotion during his tenure.32 When the NATO bombing of Libya began, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter even went as far as to ask whether sovereignty actually existed 
in light of UN authorisation for NATO powers to fulfil the Libyan state’s lapsed 
‘protection duties’, as per the terms of RtoP doctrine.33 What is needed then, is a way 
of relating this observable change in how state rights are understood and practiced, 
and the lack of comprehensive implementation of military protection and prevention 
operations. It is here, I argue, that the political theory of exceptionalism can help 
provide answers that are consistent and compelling. One field in which there is even 
more diversity of views with little direct correspondence to these schools of thought 
listed above, is the question of how to characterise the status of the doctrine itself. For 
a doctrine that has been absorbed so rapidly into the discourse of policy and 
institutions, there is remarkably little consensus as to what RtoP actually is. The 
doctrine has been variously described as a norm, as a form of ‘soft law’, as a legal 
duty of care rooted in pre-existing customary international law, and as a ‘moral 
compact’.34 It is striking that there should be such little consensus with respect to such 
a familiar feature of international discourse and policy. Here again, I argue, the 
political theory of exceptionalism can help provide insight as to the ambivalent status 
of the doctrine. To do this, we can turn to review how RtoP emerged out of 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
 
                                                 
31 See for example, Edward C. Luck, ‘R2P at Ten: A New Mindset for a New Era?’, Global 
Governance 21, (2015): 499-504; see further Ramesh Thakur, ‘The Responsibility to Protect at 15’, 
International Affairs 92, no. 2 (2016): 415-34 
32 Luck, ibid., p. 503 
33 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Was the Libyan intervention really an intervention?’, The Atlantic, 26 Aug 
2011 
34 See Thakur, op. cit., pp. 420-421 




Exceptionalism: Linking Humanitarian Intervention and the RtoP 
 
 
Narratives concerning the evolution of RtoP usually emphasise the dilemmas posed 
by humanitarian intervention to which RtoP emerged as a solution – that humanitarian 
intervention provoked a backlash from formerly colonised states suspicious of 
altruistic motives for military force; 35  that humanitarian intervention bifurcated 
possible responses into equally disagreeable alternatives of inaction or military 
force;36 or that humanitarian intervention rested too heavily on unstable foundations 
of fluctuating political will.37 While all of these observations capture aspects of the 
impasse that confronted humanitarian intervention, what is often missed in these 
discussions is the more basic issue posed by intervention – that of (re)constructing  
political order. As the doctrine does not aim to transcend the states system,38 the 
question remains of the appropriate threshold at which to transition from protection 
provided by the state to an international system of protection. 
 
While humanitarian intervention could provide the justification for eroding the power 
and authority of the sovereign state, it could not substitute any alternative to it. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, statebuilding was another outcome of the era of 
intervention.39 RtoP doctrine blended away these sharp contrasts and stark alternatives 
posed by humanitarian intervention – as part of the process of norming the exception. 
This involved the strong reassertion of the political importance and centrality of the 
state in international politics. At the same time, state authority was reconfigured in 
significant ways, as we shall see over the course of the discussion. Most importantly, 
four mass atrocity crimes were identified as potentially being legitimate grounds to 
rescind a state’s claim to non-intervention.   
 
Thus it could be said that the current consensus on the RtoP takes for granted the need 
for systematic exceptions to the norm of non-intervention. Discussion over thresholds 
and criteria for intervention, whether restrictively or expansively conceived, 
presupposes the softening of the prohibition of outside intervention in a state’s 
internal affairs.RtoP. Here, in order to understand the role exceptionalism plays in the 
doctrine, we will examine one representative document that is widely accepted as 
laying out both the theory and practice of the doctrine: the 2009 Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect report of the UN Secretary-General.40 Like its predecessor 
report of the ICISS, the 2009 report invokes Kofi Annan’s plea over sovereignty and 
intervention: ‘if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common 
humanity?’41  
                                                 
35 E.g., see Thakur, op. cit., p. 418 
36 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, p. 4  
37 Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a 
Unipolar Era’, Security Dialogue 35, no.2 (2004): passim 
38 Daniel Warner, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and Irresponsible, Cynical Engagement’ Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 32, no.1 (2003): 109-121. 
39 Francis Fukuyama, (ed.), State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004).   
40 UN, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General 12 Jan 2009.  
41 Kofi Annan, cited in ICISS report, p. vii. The humanitarian intervention that Annan is referring to is 
the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia in 1999. The 2009 report invokes Annan  





Annan is suggesting that while we may disagree about the legitimacy of particular 
interventions (such as ‘Allied Force’) or perhaps even about ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ in general, there will be some cases where we will all agree action must 
be taken in response to atrocities. Or, in other words, everyone accepts that exceptions 
are sometimes needed. It is here that a shift in focus is justified, so that the ‘key 
questions … become: What do claims of exceptionality do politically?’42 Huysmans 
justifies this shift in focus because ‘what makes political time exceptional is not the 
expansion of transnational forms of violence as such but their politicisation as 
exceptions.’43 In other words, to treat something as exceptional involves a type of 
political decision-making that can be studied in and of itself. In such circumstances 
we are dealing not only with ‘factual statements about the extraordinary nature of 
events’ but also a ‘legal and political debate in which competing interpretations of the 
nature of international political order are primarily derived from competing 
understandings of the nature and limits of normative, legal order.’44 
 
However broadly or narrowly one may define intervention in international politics, 
unless one denies in principle that there ever exist circumstances where an exception 
to a norm is needed, then one remains open to the charge of evading the hard case.45 
As Martin Wight justly observed, ‘adherents of every political belief will regard 
[international] intervention as justified under certain circumstances.’ 46  However, I 
shall argue, there is a difference between pursuing concrete exceptions and a politics 
of exceptionalism. Annan’s statement can be taken as emblematic of the pertinent 
issues.  
 
‘Every Precept of our Common Humanity’ 
 
Ian Zuckerman identifies several components of emergency – the temporal 
(immediacy), epistemic (the unexpected or sudden character of emergencies) and the 
existential (that the emergency constitutes a fundamental threat.)47 The exceptionalist 
cast of Annan’s statement is evident: by accepting the principle that there is such a 
thing as ‘an unacceptable assault on sovereignty’, Annan both concedes the 
importance of sovereignty as a Grundnorm of international order while also wishing 
to admit of circumstances where an assault on sovereignty could be ‘acceptable’. Built 
into Annan’s statement is the assumption that humanitarian emergency necessitates 
‘forms of action explicitly forbidden by general rules’48, whatever form those actions 
may take.  
 
However there are several further elements in Annan’s statement that make it a 
particular type of exceptionalist claim distinct from others. First, there is the 
                                                 
42 Huysmans, IPI, 12 
43 Ibid. 
44 Huysmans, IPE, 158 
45 As the representatives of Sweden, Germany and Ghana, among others, rebuked Prof Chomsky at the 
UN General Assembly at the 2009 General Assembly debate on the RtoP. UN (New York: Department 
of Public Information), ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits of RtoP Concept as General Assembly 
Concludes Debate’, 28 July 2009 General Assembly. UN Doc GA/10850 [online]. Available HTTP: 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/ga10850.doc.htm [accessed 10 March 2009]. 
46 Wight, Power Politics, 191 
47 Zuckerman, ‘One Law for War and Peace?’, 523 
48 Zuckerman, ‘One Law for War and Peace?’, 523 




generality and recurrence of humanitarian emergency implied in Annan’s statement. 
What is immediately apparent is that Annan is not making the case for a particular 
exception – he is not concretely discussing the need for intervention in Rwanda or 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for intervention in circumstances of ‘a Rwanda’ or ‘a 
Srebrenica’. Annan is taking Rwanda and Srebrenica as typifying a wider class of 
cases. Second, while both the epistemic and temporal character of humanitarian 
emergency is implicit in the examples given in Annan’s statement, it is the existential 
aspect to which Annan explicitly gives most prominence – ‘gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity.’ 
Annan is linking humanitarian emergency to the uncovering (or better, the formation) 
of a distinctive type of political identity forged around ‘our common humanity’. 
 
Taking its cue from Annan, the 2009 report equally emphasises the fundamental 
constitutive character of state sovereignty, and the need to prevent the ‘misuse’ of 
sovereignty as a ‘shield’ for ‘mass violence with impunity’. Again we see the 
exceptionalist claim: a commitment to general rules and a commitment to going past 
those rules in certain conditions. RtoP links these two by placing the protection duties 
of states on a spectrum with the protection duties of the international community – the 
extreme scenario is thus normalised. In this way, RtoP doctrine seeks to close the gap 
between the norm and the exception, weaving the two together. The closure of this 
conceptual gap implicates a distinctive kind of exceptionalist politics – one in which 
exceptionalist practice is not a matter of concrete transgressions but rather is 
embedded in routine, functioning of political and legal order. 
 
Strikingly, the report follows through on this conceptual shift to emphasising the 
recurrence and general character of these extreme scenarios, noting that they are 
geographically diffuse, spread across varying levels of national development and 
occurring both as part of and independently of ongoing conflicts. 49  These ‘worst 
human tragedies’ are politically linked to the ‘legitimacy and credibility of the United 
Nations and its partners’. These points and claims are reinforced and developed across 
the report to link to the deepest forms of political identity – ‘Humanity expects it and 
history demands it’.50 As we shall see further below, the range of political and legal 
institutions are subsequently reframed and adapted as a result of this norming the 
exception. In the typology of exceptionalist politics developed by Huysmans, this 
exceptionalism would be characterised as decisionistic and existential as opposed to 
normativist. For Huysmans, in normativist understandings of exceptionalism the 
contest is over how political power can legitimately transgress existing normative 
order in concrete instances. 51  By contrast the recurrence of emergencies and the 
concurrent routinisation of exceptionalist practice suggests decisionism: ‘While 
normativist visions of international political order seek to limit the assertion of 
arbitrary exercise of power as much as possible … decisionist visions make the 
arbitrary exercise of power [i.e., transgression of norms] a permanent and immanent 
condition of normative order.’52 It is important to stress that decisionism is expressly 
not a ‘political and theoretical argument against the international rule of law’. Rather 
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the exception is understood to underpin the rule of law as ‘a permanent and inherent 
element of an effectively functioning normative “paradise”’.53 
 
Exceptionalism and Interventionism 
 
Emergencies, by their very nature, tend to be presented as unmediated – rents torn 
open in a normative framework. But as the preceding discussion shows, a variety of 
exceptionalist responses to emergencies are possible, and the nature of the response 
will partly depend on how the emergency itself is cast. Understanding exceptionalism 
in humanitarian emergencies as an existential and decisionist form of exceptionalism 
helps conceptually integrate several distinct aspects of international interventionism, 




First, Huysmans argues that asserting authentic political identity around exceptions, 
despite the link to a irruptive crisis, is in fact primarily about political renewal through 
the establishment of a new, more authentic political identity54 Jean Cohen describes 
the ‘inwardness’ of exceptionalist practice as the ‘solipsistic conception’ of 
sovereignty. The ‘solipsistic sovereign’ recognises only its own will, which is 
privileged over ‘existing rules of law’55  and mirrors imperialist practice:  ‘An empire 
knows no equals nor clear boundaries, it regards its domestic law as global right, it 
sees the independence of other polities as contingent on its will, and it exists in a 
hierarchical relation with a shifting “periphery”’.56  
 
In order for authenticity to be expressed against the merely ordinary or ersatz, a 
rupture or break with the ‘normal everydayness of politics, characterised by 
objectified forms of mediating relations with others’57 is necessary – a cutting away of 
‘[i]nstitutions, objectified symbolic frameworks and social networks’ 58 . In 
international political terms, this results in what Huysmans terms (borrowing from 
James Der Derian) ‘anti-diplomacy’: 59  established regulatory frameworks that 
mediate estrangement between states and political communities are flattened out.60   
 
Anti-diplomacy explains aspects both of humanitarian intervention and its substitution 
by RtoP. In terms of interventionism, anti-diplomacy helps explain the common 
complaints made against the UN in the context of these debates, when its very role 
and rationale is called into question in a way that would be illogical from the 
standpoint of classical diplomacy or strategy. For example, criticisms of the UN for 
the diplomatic representation and international recognition that it extends to all states, 
regardless of their internal government arrangements.61 The premium that the UN (by 
its very nature) places on consensus-building and diplomacy is inevitably seen as a 
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barrier to the needs of existential authenticity and moral emergency.62 In the UN 
Security Council, there is the ongoing effort to restrain the use of the veto in situations 
of humanitarian emergency – seeking to suppress one of the core integrative aspects 
of international society.63   
 
‘Solipsistic sovereignty’ also helps explain the demise of humanitarian intervention. 
As this existential expression of political identity recognises no legitimate will outside 
itself, nor institutional barrier to mediate its relations with other political communities, 
its limits become physical ones to the projection of its identity: ‘The limit to one’s 
interaction are reduced to physical limits, such as military overstretch.’64 Ever since 
American President Bill Clinton publicly apologised for failing to halt atrocities in 
Rwanda in 1994, among Western powers the presumption remains that non-
intervention is a question of circumstance and expediency more than recognising the 
classical right to non-intervention.65 In other words, it is not norms that will halt 
intervention any longer – only expediency. 
 
Anti-diplomacy and this existential form of political identity also helps explain the 
difficulty of establishing criteria or norms by which state sovereignty is rescinded in 
favour of the international RtoP. Regardless of how crises and thresholds are defined, 
even the most stringent criteria cannot eliminate the need for an outside state to make 
a politically-driven decision as to whether or not a crisis merits intervention. It is 
simply not possible to draw up a list of criteria for the violation of sovereignty for 
which all states would agree at once, let alone in advance. In a word, threshold 
conditions will always be politically understood – ‘subject to interpretation and 
manipulation’.66 Alex J. Bellamy understands this ‘problem of indeterminacy’ as a 
question of securing multilateral agreement:  ‘there is no guarantee that when 
confronting a humanitarian emergency, states would agree that a just cause threshold 
has been crossed, or the precautionary principles satisfied’.67 Alternatively, it is seen 
as a problem of reconciling international norms with national interests: the Chinese 
and Russians suspicious of setting criteria that may be open to abuse, the Americans 
and British keen to preserve their freedom of action outside the Security Council.68 
  
But if the argument developed here is right, then the problem runs deeper than this: 
the exceptionalist expression of existential political identity is defined by its hostility 
to extant institutions and positive law, and it evades and disrupts formalization. 
Nicholas Wheeler himself drew attention to this when he criticised proposals for 
institutional reform to make humanitarian intervention more legitimate: ‘changing the 
decision-making mechanism will not eliminate the challenge of balancing the moral 
imperative to use force to rescue imperilled humanity against the pragmatic question 
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of whether force will succeed and do more good than harm.’69 The ICISS report 
enjoins the adoption of its proposals under the threat that ‘concerned states will rule 
out other means and forms of action to meet the gravity and urgency of these 
situations […] pressures for intervention by ad hoc coalitions or individual states will 
intensify’.70  
 
The turn to atrocity prevention  
 
I believe that examining the RtoP as a decisionistic approach to exceptionalism also 
helps explain the turn to atrocity prevention, as seen in the newly forged post-2005 
consensus on the doctrine. Critics of the Outcome Document essentially take conflict 
management to be a substitute for humanitarian intervention. In Thomas Weiss’ 
damning verdict, ‘most of the mumbling and stammering about [conflict] prevention 
is a superficially attractive but highly unrealistic way to try and pretend that we can 
finesse the hard issues of what essentially amounts to humanitarian intervention.’71 
However, one can only substitute for the other since the expansion of bald 
interventionism in the post-Cold War period. If conflict prevention is seen as a half-
way house between coercive military intervention and inaction, then this already to 
some measure a concession to the acceptability of intervention. Indeed, the ICISS 
report explicitly uses the language of a ‘continuum of intervention:’72 If intervention 
is not a discrete moment or specific collision of political wills but a spectrum and 
complex of activities, then it is clearly more difficult to say where it begins and where 
it should end. ‘Soft intervention’ is thus the result of norming the exception: by 
softening the prohibition on intervention ‘[t]his form of preventive intervention would 
institute comprehensive Western regulation under the threat of military intervention if 
non-Western states were “unwilling or unable to cooperate”’.73 
 
If UN activities such as conflict prevention are rationalised through the prism of 
exceptionalism and seen as lying on a ‘continuum of intervention’, we have a re-
organisation of international conflict prevention activity around a decisionistic 
framework. Visualising intervention as a continuum of activities means that 
humanitarian crisis is seen as an ever-present and immanent possibility, before it even 
erupts:  
 
Like normativist positions, decisionism seeks to incorporate normative 
exceptions into a legal order, but unlike normativism it makes arbitrary exercise 
of power, and thus exceptions, a normal phenomenon that is inherent in legally 
defined political orders.74   
 
Decisionism is thus not a theory of extremes, but of normality – or rather, normality is 
defined through the exceptional; the exception is a permanent condition of normative 
order. Both the reconceptualisation of conflict prevention through the RtoP, and the 
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practice of humanitarian intervention, are linked as forms of exceptionalist practice 
and decisionism. One does not exclude the other, but more to the point, both are 
consistent with the immanence of humanitarian emergency in world politics and the 
need to adapt the existing normative order the better to incorporate and ‘normalise’ 
responses to such emergencies.   
 
Once the RtoP is understood as a doctrine of exceptionalism this perhaps also helps 
explain why it has been accepted by states so quickly. Louise Arbour for example 
muses whether the rapid uptake of the doctrine may be because states perceive it to be 
a ‘merely moral or political’ obligation: i.e., the consequences resulting from ‘a 
failure to discharge’ the responsibility are only ‘of limited’ if not ‘altogether 
negligible’ concern to ‘the … duty bearers’ in question.75  
 
The dispute over thresholds and criteria lies over how to have the best possible 
guarantee of action in conditions of emergency. As a doctrine of exceptionalism, the 
RtoP offers no guarantee of action in any case: under exceptionalism, it is the 
discretionary power of the state that is enhanced. Exceptionalism, by its nature, does 
not pre-commit the state to undertake any particular action in any particular 
emergency. The significance of this is that the state is not limited or circumscribed in 
any significant way by its decisions to intervene or arbitrate in particular emergencies.  
 
While it is true that the RtoP establishes a language within which state action can be 
demanded in particular circumstances, it is questionable whether this offers any 
countervailing check to the enhanced power of state discretion in conditions of crisis. 
Exhorting a state to greater efforts in a particular emergency is consistent with the 
exceptionalist imperative of extending state power rather than limiting it. Charges of 
selective, partial or hypocritical interventions are easily turned into demands for 
extending intervention so that it is systematic and impartial. By reconceptualising the 
basis of atrocity prevention as simply a moment on ‘a continuum of intervention’, the 
grounds for intervention have not been eliminated.  
 
It could be argued that the reinterpretation of conflict prevention through subsumption 
under RtoP also reflects the end of the telos of liberal internationalism. Traditionally, 
the liberal project in international affairs has looked to the gradual restriction, 
suppression and eventual elimination of violence from an increasingly rational and 
globalised political order.76 In place of this doctrine, the new doctrine of decisionistic 
atrocity prevention signals a shift to an ongoing project of managing conflict, and 
with it the acceptance of the need to pre-empt and arbitrate constantly recurring 
humanitarian emergencies. Typical of the language surrounding the doctrine is the 
emphasis on the inevitability of humanitarian emergency, as stressed by Gareth Evans 
elsewhere: ‘It is the responsibility of the whole international community to ensure that 
when the next case of threatened mass killing or ethnic cleansing invariably comes 
along, the mistakes of the 1990s will not be repeated.’77 Such language chimes with 
Kofi Annan’s invocation of the atrocities of Srebrenica and Rwanda not as concrete 
exceptions but as frequent and immanent catastrophes within the international system.  
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More broadly, such an approach reflects the conservatism of emergency politics: a 
recurrent demand for imminent action in response to emergencies helps obviate the 
need to justify existing political arrangements in the international order. A political 
system that wins its allegiance through effective response to emergency makes 
questions of political direction, will and purpose redundant: when effective response 
to emergencies becomes the central question of politics, this can only work to 




This takes us to the question of why humanitarian liberalism has become intertwined 
with an existential politics of exceptionalism. How have liberal polities become 
reliant on a doctrine more associated with Carl Schmitt’s rationale for fascist 
dictatorship than liberal approaches to conflict resolution? If existential 
exceptionalism links the formation of authentic political identity to exceptional 
circumstances, why is there the need to forge political identity in this way, and why 
has it come to prominence since the end of the Cold War?  
 
The most immediate explanation would seem to lie in the decline of ideological 
combat over competing visions of a future international order – combat that ended 
with the end of the Cold War. The victory of liberalism at the end of the Cold War 
had the result that the only means of recreating political momentum from within 
liberal politics is by cutting away existing institutional forms and linking new, more 
authentic forms of political identity to particular types of emergency: ‘The end of 
utopia has brought the sanctification of emergency, elevating it into a central political 
category.’78 Jean Cohen vividly describes the result of these exceptionalist practices: 
 
interventions are presented as supreme emergencies so as to block legal 
formalization of rules that could carefully circumscribe exceptions to the non-
intervention principle by articulating the proper authority to make the decision 
and the thresholds or criteria and procedures that should guide it, as well as 
accountability mechanisms for such decisions.79 
 
The Paternalist Legitimation of State Power 
 
If there is to be no return to earlier norms of non-intervention, what then is left of 
critique of intervention beyond that of expediency? Part of the consensus around the 
RtoP rests on the agreement that it is states that bear the duty to protect people on 
their territories from mass atrocity.80 On the face of it, this would seem to be one of 
those commonplaces that accompany attempts at cohering diplomatic consensus – so 
banal that it barely merits comment. In the ICISS report for example, the insistence on 
states as bearers of the duty to protect was clearly offered as a means quelling fears of 
human rights imperialism among developing countries.81 Evidently seeking to avoid 
anything as controversial as questioning the legitimacy of internal political 
                                                 
78 Zaki Laïdi, A World Without Meaning: The crisis of meaning in international politics. Trans. June 
Burnham & Jenny Coulon. (London: Routledge, 1998) p.11 
79 Cohen, ‘Sovereign Equality’, 496-497 
80 Cf. n. 30 above. 
81 ICISS, 44-45 




arrangements, the framers of the doctrine have settled on a formula acceptable to any 
state. The idea that states are required to provide certain fundaments of social and 
political order is after all a basic tenet of modern government as such. To the extent 
that the doctrine clearly privileges extant authorities and incumbent states in any 
particular territory (assuming that they are functioning to some degree), it is a 
conservative prescription for international stability, whose appeal to incumbent states 
and regimes is evident.  
 
However, it would be a mistake to classify these ideas as merely empty diplomatic 
phrases. The conception of state legitimacy in the doctrine is based on the ability of 
states effectively to provide a particular set of internationally-sanctioned security 
requirements. The emphasis that the doctrine places on security can be seen in the fact 
that states are viewed as dispensable providers of security, which can be substituted 
by the international community should an incumbent state fail in its role. Indeed, 
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan went as far as to claim that the ‘primary 
raison d’être and duty’ of every state is to protect its population.82  
 
If the legitimacy of statehood is to be passed on the provision of certain 
internationally-sanctioned types of security, this can only have the effect of 
relativising states as institutionalised expressions of collective political will. In this 
vision, the rights of state sovereignty flow not from the will of the people, but 
downwards from the international community. Cohen describes this process as the 
reduction of states to vectors of the international community, ‘administrative units in a 
decentralized, “multileveled” global governance structure that accords “autonomy” 
provisionally …’83 This is the only way in which we can logically interpret the claim 
that states could at once be primary duty bearers, and how it could be legitimate for 
their rights to be rescinded by the international community. Therefore, it is not merely 
then that the doctrine does not distinguish between authoritarian and democratic 
states, but that it rewrites the very idea of representative government in such a way 
that favours state power in place of people power. More than revamping international 
norms governing the use of force, the RtoP recasts the rationale for sovereignty. The 
norms governing the use of force change as a secondary effect of this prior 
recalibration of sovereign responsibilities – intervention is no longer seen as 
intervention, but simply as the fulfilment of pre-ordained international duties.84  
Judging by the UN General Assembly debate over the RtoP, the majority of states are 
keen to avoid issuing licenses for external intervention in states’ internal affairs, while 
the great powers are keen to avoid the RtoP limiting their freedom of manoeuvre.85 
Perhaps some developing countries even see the RtoP as fostering a language under 
whose rubric resource transfer could be affected which would help strengthen their 
institutional machinery and security apparatus, the better to help maintain their 
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domestic RtoP. 86  What underlies this consensus of overlapping interests is a 
‘paternalist legitimation of state power through the inflation of security into the 
supreme objective of politics.’87  If the state can be held accountable by external 
powers for the duties it owes its people, then the only logical interpretation can be that 
the state is in the position of having responsibility for its people rather than to its 
people. Cohen describes this process as the reduction of states to vectors of the 
international community, ‘administrative units in a decentralized, “multileveled” 
global governance structure that accords “autonomy” provisionally …’88 This is the 
ultimate logic of exceptionalism – the blurring of the distinction between constitutive 
and constituted political power.89 The politics of emergency frames legitimacy around 
questions of efficacious action rather than legitimate representation. Exceptionalism 
invokes a politics of fear that collapses the dialectic of mediated representation into 
one where the efficiency of power and protection is privileged over all else. 
Sovereignty cannot be decentred without loosening the bonds of internal political 
representation that restrain state power.  
 
RtoP and Political Theories of Protection 
 
There is of course a long and significant political theorising of protection stretching 
back to the beginning of modern political theory with Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. As 
noted by Anne Orford, a strong focus on protection ‘as the “raison d’etre” of the state 
is to be in a complicated relation to a long tradition of absolutist theories of 
statehood’. 90  The political structure of the absolutist state eventually came to be 
‘realised in the fascist states of twentieth-century Europe’.91 Yet there also significant 
innovations to this tradition that can be associated with RtoP and that are downplayed 
by Orford – notably the fact that RtoP untwines protection and representation more 
systematically than even the most extreme Hobbesianism. Hobbes too notoriously 
emplaced effective protection (the ‘safety of the people’92) as the supreme end and 
justification of the state, to the extent of ignoring whether sovereigns were established 
by ‘mutual covenants’ or by conquest. These latter questions are all equally sidelined 
by ’RtoP. Yet even Hobbes’ vision retained at its core the element of reciprocity 
between people and state in so far as the failure to provide effective protection 
dissolved any obligation the individual owed to the sovereign.93 Such a view requires 
imputing some minimal degree of agency to individuals beneath the sovereign. More 
fundamentally, the structures of Hobbes’ theory necessitates individual agency by 
virtue of being contractarian – the sovereign can only be assembled through 
coordinated consent among individuals. Even Carl Schmitt’s belligerent and 
existentialist theory of sovereign security is linked to notions of representation in as 
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much as the sovereign is seen to be the authentic political expression of a given 
concrete people.94 
 
In RtoP, the agency of individuals is snuffed out more thoroughly than the Leviathan 
ever could, for the failure to provide effective protection is a question that will be 
decided not by the subjects of the sovereign but by the international community 
(which in the last instance means the great powers). This is consistent with, and sheds 
new light on the emphasis on victims in varied expressions of the doctrine95: victims 
are defined by their suffering and passivity, and their dependence on external 
benefactors. Of course we cannot leave international governance structures out of the 
picture given their significant scope today and the role that they play in RtoP doctrine. 
Perhaps Hobbes has no choice but conceptually to delineate the specific conditions 
under which individuals can exercise their will free of the sovereign, given that there 
was no real possibility of a spectrum of protection in Hobbes’ day, whether 
institutionalised transnational networks or coordinated multilateral state action. 
Schmitt’s vision, by contrast, is explicitly to fuse organicist, national collectives 
against the international governance structures of the League of Nations, thereby also 
theoretically necessitating some degree of reciprocity between sovereign and people.  
 
By contrast the growth of transnational governance structures over the last century – 
or what Orford calls ‘international executive roles’ – means that even less account can 
be given to such concerns in theories of RtoP. Individuals have rights under RtoP only 
in as much as they are recognised as victims of mass atrocity crimes. With a larger 
menu of institutionalised protection possibilities, it is possible to shunt people from 
one protection structure to another without needing to reckon with the political needs 
and agency of the individuals concerned, or needs of representation. To be sure, RtoP 
doctrine has generated plenty of discussion with respect to elaborating so-called 
‘pillar II’ efforts – the specific capacities and concrete institutions that states need in 
order to fulfil their protection duties effectively. Many of these recommended 
‘atrocity inhibitors’ are markedly liberal in design and ethos, confirming to ideals of 
separation and even distribution of powers, oversight, monitoring and regulation of 
power, inclusivity and participation. The 2015 report of the Secretary-General ‘A vital 
and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect’ mentions, for 
example, the need for a professional security sector, impartial institutions to oversee 
political transition, independent judicial institutions, a media capacity to counteract 
prejudice, etc.96 Leaving aside how we might evaluate the effectiveness of such 
‘inhibitors’, what is significant for our purposes here is that whatever the political 
provenance of such RtoP-conforming institutions, in RtoP terms their only 
significance is with regards to atrocity prevention and protection. The more concrete 
the prescriptions of RtoP doctrine become, the more and more a wide array of 
political and civil institutions become defined by the imperative of effective 
protection to the exclusion of competing concerns. It is important that we are not blind 
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to this process of political reframing even if many of the institutions and practices in 
question look friendly and familiar.  
 
Concluding Thoughts  
  
Giorgio Agamben notoriously described the ‘state of exception’ as the ‘arcanum 
imperii [secret of power] par excellence of our time’97 and the ‘constitutive paradigm 
of the juridical order’.98 But we need not succumb to Agamben’s hyperbole to try and 
grip hold of the status of exceptionalism in international law and politics today.99  
 
The evolution of the debate regarding the rights of sovereign states and humanitarian 
emergency into a debate over RtoP means that the stakes of the debate are no longer 
centred on the question of the territorial integrity or sovereign rights of states, but 
rather on the question of how state power is to be legitimated in line with effective 
production of security.  If the high tide of humanitarian intervention has ebbed, it has 
left in place an authoritarian vision of state power, with security elevated over self-
determination and representation. The supporters of RtoP are keen to stress its 
differences with humanitarian intervention, in order to defuse the controversies over 
the latter. In contrast to the more imperious and ambitious visions associated with 
humanitarian intervention, the appeal of RtoP lies in its comparative modesty and 
proximity to existing political and legal practice, as well as its supposed rootedness in 
history.100 RtoP is less about grand schemes of institution-building or opening new 
political vistas, and more about the adaptation and reframing of existing practice in 
response to extreme mass atrocities. I have argued here that this is best understood as 
a way of norming the exception, and that these changes are significant and troubling 
even if we are not seeing a new age of intervention.   
 
What is more, the evolution of RtoP is consistent with the earlier expressions of 
humanitarian intervention, in so far as RtoP also assumes passivity on the part of 
suffering victims alongside the paternalistic logic of ‘human protection’ that 
accompanies this assumption. While a cosmopolitan ‘right of humanitarian 
intervention’ reflected the hubris of Western victory in the Cold War, it could never 
be a stable basis on which to order international affairs, as it would inevitably give 
rise to disputes between the great powers, either over interventions into each other’s 
spheres of influence or over where it was legitimate to extend those rights of 
intervention (as occurred with the 1999 Kosovo War or the 2003 invasion of Iraq). If 
the doctrine of ‘RtoP that emerged in the wake of the 2005 World Summit reflects a 
retrenchment of humanitarian liberalism in the face of new geopolitical realities, the 
newfound consensus seems to have coalesced around a pastoral vision of state power, 
with states ministering to the human security needs of their populations more than 
they have to answer to them.  
 
The question of varieties of exceptionalism sharply focuses our attention on the value 
and place of norms in international relations. Historically, the norm of non-
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intervention was honoured in the breach as much as the observance. So what is the 
value of any norm so routinely violated? In practice, power will always be exercised 
in ways which escape pre-established ideals. But the routine political critique of 
existing institutions often proceeds by way of comparing reality against ideals. In the 
Cold War for example, the sham of independence was often exposed by drawing 
attention to a foreign-sponsored or quisling regime.  
 
Disguising intervention by resort to proxy forces, covert sabotage or magnanimously 
responding to calls for help ‘requested’ by client regimes were the rituals of homage 
that vice paid to virtue during the Cold War. No longer: an international order that has 
‘normed the exception’ has also introduced deformalised and murky standards. The 
absence of clear standards by which political action and power can be held to account 
is not only significant in that it may encroach on the self-determination of other 
nations, it also expresses a type of sovereignty that is not moored in any relationship 
with a particular constituency, and for that reason is free from any constituent power – 
‘universal sovereignty.’ This logic goes beyond the threat of instituting neo-imperial 
rule over the developing world to vitiate the very principle of political 
representation.101  
 
Debates about the place and scope of ‘thresholds’, ‘criteria’ and ‘triggers’ for external 
intervention and on the overall status of RtoP only speaks to the deformalization of 
international law regarding the rights of sovereign states. For it is only when 
intervention is less prohibited that the question arises of when and how to limit it. 
Importing exceptionalism to the core of international law corrodes its very 
foundations. By its nature exceptionalism will always resist being incorporated into 
any positive rule or norm, as indeed is the intention of the original theorists of 
exceptionalism: arbitrary power that escapes a ‘shared standard of criticism’.102  Such 
developments suggest the involution of international law in to a new natural law of 
substantive values which exists to be enforced at the will of any state that is able to act 
as a ‘universal sovereign’. ‘When diplomacy is violent and unscrupulous’, according 
to Martin Wight, ‘international law soars into the regions of natural law; when 
diplomacy acquires a certain habit of co-operation, international law crawls in the 
mud of legal positivism.’103  
 
It is always possible to mentally construct hypothetical future scenarios in which the 
argument for intervention is beyond challenge and every reasonable person would 
agree with it. Such scenarios should not be allowed to stand in for an argument that 
the international order be re-organised to make intervention more permissible, and the 
attempt to force everyone to plan in advance how to better accommodate the 
possibility and consequences flowing from intervention. These are the two separate 
stages that Kofi Annan collapses in to one, when he poses his question of how to 
respond to ‘another Rwanda’. The better and more difficult question is not how best 




                                                 
101 For a critique of RtoP as a neo-imperial project, see Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Responsibility to Protect 
or Right to Punish?’, in Cunliffe (ed.), Critical Perspectives  
102 Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters’, 415 
103 Wight, ‘Why is There No International Theory?’, pp.28-29 
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